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The Kalman Filter has been called one of the greatest inventions in statistics during
the 20th century. Its purpose is to measure the state of a system by processing the
noisy data received from different electronic sensors. In comparison, a useful resource
for managers in their effort to make the right decisions is the wisdom of crowds. This
phenomenon allows managers to combine judgments by different employees to get es-
timates that are often more accurate and reliable than estimates, which managers
produce alone. Since harnessing the collective intelligence of employees, and filtering
signals from multiple noisy sensors appear related, we looked at the possibility of using
the Kalman Filter on estimates by people. Our predictions suggest, and our findings
based on the Survey of Professional Forecasters reveal, that the Kalman Filter can
help managers solve their decision-making problems by giving them stronger signals
before they choose. Indeed, when used on a subset of forecasters identified by the
Contribution Weighted Model, the Kalman Filter beat that rule clearly, across all the
forecasting horizons in the survey.
JEL-codes: C53, D80, D82, D84, D87.
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I. Introduction
When managers decide what to do, they often base their choices on forecasts of
future magnitudes. Examples are easy to find. Before deciding whom to hire,
the manager estimates future productivity, before setting the path of R&D, the
manager estimates future returns, before diversifying, the manager estimates
future demand, and so the list goes on. In each case, estimates with lower
errors are better. Unfortunately, to reduce error is not trivial, and managers
often make the wrong choice because of their imprecision.
When it comes to forecasting errors, imperfections of human cognition play
an essential role. Although our cognitive system is an outstanding device for
measuring the present, it has more difficulty estimating things yet to occur.
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Estimating the weight of milk, the distance to the carton, and the amount of
effort needed to serve a glass is unproblematic for most people, but when asked
to estimate the amount of milk they will spill during the next year despite their
sensory and motor skill, most people feel uncertain and make sizable mistakes.
As the forecast horizon reaches further into the future, the faults of human
cognition create an uncertain relation between what we think will happen, and
what does.
Scholars have long known (Galton, 1907) that while the estimates we make
alone are often subject to glaring errors, we can combine them with estimates
made by others to form an aggregate that improves both accuracy and precision.
Scholars have called this phenomenon many things, from Vox Populi (Galton,
1907) to Rational Expectations (Muth, 1961), to the Many Wrongs Principle
(Simons, 2004), but most recently Surowiecki (2004) called it the Wisdom of
the Crowds, and that name has stuck.
There are many ways to fuse estimates from different sources and researchers
have produced many rules for doing that. These include both formal rules
where people never interact and social rules where they do. The most famous
rule is the simple average or the Equal-Weight Model (EWM). However, other
common rules include designs for social interaction like the Delphi method by
the RAND Corporation (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963), Social Judgment Analysis
(Hammond, 1965; Dhami and Olsson, 2008) based on cue learning psychology
(Tolman and Brunswik, 1935), and anonymous trading in prediction markets
(Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004) used first by the University of Iowa. Other rules
grant access to information about prior performances (King et al., 2012), while
some combine estimates by subsets of people and ignore those made by others
(Budescu and Chen, 2015; Mannes et al., 2014). The latest rules in that last
category have done particularly well (Budescu and Chen, 2015; Chen et al.,
2016). More specifically, the so-called Contribution Weighted Model (CWM)
has beaten many other rules not only because it has an algorithm for finding
subsets of strong forecasters, but also because it puts different weights on their
estimates using relative measures (Budescu and Chen, 2015; Chen et al., 2016)
of how they performed in the past.
It might surprise that when estimates are independent and unbiased, and
the aim of combining estimates is to minimize the uncertainty and bias about
the truth, and when we know what uncertainty to expect from each source
of estimates, then none of the above rules are best. That is a matter of fact
because the best rule, under those conditions, appeared sixty years ago (Kalman,
1960) and turned out to be one of the greatest achievements in statistics during
the 20th century (Grewal and Andrews, 2008). This Bayesian rule not only
guided Armstrong to the moon and back (McGee and Schmidt, 1985) but now
supports almost any technology that needs to estimate the state of the world
from noisy data, including GPS and inertial guidance systems in planes. The
rule in question is the Kalman Filter (KF).
Why researchers have developed so many rules to harness the wisdom of
crowds without giving much attention to the KF, is a good question. One
reason might be that engineers use the KF to combine estimates by electronic
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sensors, and electronic sensors seem very different from human perception. As
such, the possibility of using the KF on human magnitude estimates has perhaps
just been unclear. On the other hand, psychophysicists (Luce, 1972) have long
argued that humans are, among other things, measuring devices, which suggests
the issue goes beyond perceived relevance. Indeed, the other reason may be
actual relevance, given what we can know about the cognitive system. After
all, Electronic sensors are specialized to domains, and we can discover their
uncertainty through intensive tests and calibrations. In contrast, our knowledge
about the source of human judgment (i.e., the brain) is vaguer, and we cannot
run the same tests on people. Therefore, since the KF assumes good knowledge
about the uncertainty produced by the source of measurements, researchers
may have developed the many alternative rules because they suppose the KF
harnesses the wisdom of crowds poorly in practice. Nevertheless, we do not
know with any certainty because few studies have tried to find out.
In this paper, we clarify things by moving the KF from engineering to man-
agement so that we can match it against the EWM and the CWR. We do
this using a model of judgment, which appeared recently in mathematical psy-
chology (Nash, 2017). The model lets us implement the KF on estimates by
humans while offering a theory for the source of uncertainty in such estimates.
The model also lets us ask at what point our knowledge of the uncertainty in
estimates is so vague that the EWM and the CWM will beat the KF, and we
derive precise answers to this question. We then test our prediction using sixty
surveys of professional forecasters about economic variables over five forecasting
horizons.
Based on our findings we conclude, as Budescu and Chen recently did (Bude-
scu and Chen, 2015), that the main attraction of the CWM is not in assigning
optimal weight to estimates, but in identifying individuals with superior judg-
ment ability. To that statement, we add that when the CWM has identified
these judges, one ought to hand the job of assigning weights to the KF.
II. The Kalman Filter
A butcher and a farmer meet at a country market. The farmer has an ox that
he wants to sell, and the butcher is interested in buying. Now, they must agree
on a price.
There is a straightforward link between what oxen weigh, and what oxen
cost in the market, so the butcher and the farmer must weigh the ox to reach an
agreement. Regrettably, someone has broken the market’s official scale. Both
the farmer and the butcher, however, have scales of their own, but these are
imperfect. Consequently, the relationship between their output and what the
ox weighs is uncertain.
How should the butcher and the farmer use their scales to minimize the
mean squared error (MSE) to the correct price? Assuming the measurements
produced by the scales are probabilistic and independent, and assuming the
degrees of uncertainty in the scales are known, then the KF offers the answer.
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To see this, let us first consider the definition of MSE by using the butcher’s
scale as an example. Denoting the butcher’s scale by subscript 1, the definition
of MSE is
(1) MSE1 = σ
2
1 + (X − µ1)2
where σ21 is the uncertainty of the butcher’s scale, captured by the variance of
the estimates it produces, µ1 is the mean estimate produced by the scale, and
X is the actual weight of the ox.
From equation (1) we notice two things. First, X − µ1 captures how biased
the butcher’s scale is, and second, when X = µ1 the butcher’s scale is unbiased,
such that MSE1 = σ
2
1 .
Now let us introduce the farmer’s scale, and denote it by subscript 2. The
problem of how to use the two scales to minimize MSE amounts to working out
how much weight to place on the estimates produced by each scale to obtain
an aggregate estimate that minimizes MSE. We denote the weight placed on
estimates produced by the butcher’s scale as w1 and denote the weight placed
on estimates produced by the farmer’s scale as w2. Then we assume weights are
best placed linearly, such that MSE of the aggregate estimate is
(2) MSE1,2 = (σ
2
1w
2
1 + σ
2
2w
2
2) + ((w1µ1 + w2µ2)−X)2
Next, we will assume that any weight not placed on estimates produced by
the butcher’s scale will instead be placed on the farmer’s scales, thus establishing
a weighted average. Accordingly, we can substitute w2 with 1−w1 and re-state
equation (2) as
(3) MSE1,2 = (σ
2
1w
2
1 + σ
2
2(1− w1)2) + ((w1µ1 + (1− w1)µ2)−X)2.
From here, we simply differentiate equation (3) with respect to w1, set the
resulting equation to zero, and solve for w1. Performing this procedure (and
verifying the second derivative is positive) we obtain the optimal weights to
place on estimates by each scale
(4) w∗1 =
σ22 + (µ1 − µ2) (X − µ2)
(µ1 − µ2) 2 + σ21 + σ22
.
and
(5) w∗2 = 1−
σ22 + (µ1 − µ2) (X − µ2)
(µ1 − µ2) 2 + σ21 + σ22
.
From equations (4) and (5) we notice the intuitive result that more weight
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should be placed on the estimate produced by the butcher’s scale when the
uncertainty of that scale is smaller compared to the uncertainty of the farmer’s
scale, holding the levels of bias constant. Accordingly, the weight associated with
a particular scale is not in general fixed, but depends on its uncertainty relative
the uncertainty of the second scale, and vice versa. That becomes clearer as we
now introduce the assumption by Kalman (1960) that sensors provide unbiased
estimates. In this case, equations (4) and (5) are reduced to
(6) w∗1 =
σ22
σ21 + σ
2
2
.
and
(7) w∗2 = 1−
σ22
σ21 + σ
2
2
.
which are commonly referred to as the Kalman Gains.
II.A. Verification by the a third party:
The butcher and the farmer now have what they need to reach an agreement
on price. What they must do is take their estimates, x1 and x2, weigh them by
w1 and w2 respectively, sum what they obtain, and convert this sum to a price
according to the market’s rule.
However, suppose a market official wants to verify that everything is in
good order. To do that, the official will use a third, unofficial scale to update
the butcher’s and the farmer’s combined estimate. The aim is not only to reduce
MSE further using new evidence but also to keep MSE minimized.
While the official could combine the estimates of two or more sensors at once
and obtain an optimal result, part of the beauty of the KF is that it offers the
possibility to combine estimates one by one, while remaining optimal at every
step.
To see that, we insert the Kalman Gains into equation (2) and note the right
side of the equation falls away. Equation (2) hence simplifies to
(8) MSEKF =
σ21σ
2
2
σ21 + σ
2
2
.
Because the butcher’s scale and the farmer’s scale are now unbiased, equation
(8) equals the uncertainty of their combined estimate. At this point it is common
in practice to assume that uncertainty is described not only by white noise, but
Gaussian white noise. The reasons for that assumption, besides often being
realistic for electronic sensors, is that engineers can thereby use the Gaussian
distribution’s rare property of closure under multiplication. Specifically, due to
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this property, we can express equation (8) simply as σ2KF , where this constant is
the variance of another Gaussian distribution. As such, the combined estimate
becomes no different, mathematically, from the butcher’s estimate that started
the process. Accordingly, we have reset the process computationally, while
keeping it optimal. We can easily add more estimates using equations (6) and
(7) without inflating the computational demand on the system that implements
the filter. Moreover, as we do that, our approach to filtering the signal from
noise remains the best of any conceivable form (Maybeck, 1979). Indeed, even
if the Gaussian assumption is removed, the KF is the best (minimum error
variance) filter out of the class of linear unbiased filters (Maybeck, 1979).
Given the constraints of computers at the time, the reader can now appreci-
ate why the KF became so crucial for Project Apollo. However, the reader must
also realize the above exposition only revealed the essential part of the KF. When
the KF directs navigation systems, for example, it must account for sensor read-
ings received at different points in time. Consequently, since significant changes
occur between readings, the dynamic KF accounts for those changes by model-
ing them. For example, navigation systems incorporate Newton’s equations of
motion. The static KF suffices, however, when we can reasonably assume that
estimates are made simultaneously.
III. The Augmented Quincunx
Suppose the official scale was the only proper scale in the market. If the butcher
and farmer both insist on trading, they would need to measure the weight of the
ox using just their cognitive system. Furthermore, if the official wanted to verify
that everything was in good order, he would need to do the same. Nevertheless,
the KF is relevant in this setting too, and the Augmented Quincunx (AQ) model
of judgment can be used to appreciate why that is.
The AQ recently (Nash, 2017) joined the family of sequential sampling mod-
els. These models do an excellent job predicting observed patterns relating to
choice (Forstmann et al., 2016). Moreover, they work at the algorithmic level
(Marr, 1982), which means they not only predict the outcomes of thinking but
also propose reasons for those outcomes. Furthermore, they have solid neuro-
physiological foundations (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Gold and Shadlen, 2007;
Latimer et al., 2015). But other sequential sampling models cannot be used to
study magnitude estimation, and the AQ model bridges that gap. It does so by
separating the objective properties of the environment, on the one hand, from
the subjective properties the cognitive system perceives, on the other.
III.A. The Environment
The AQ assumes the environment, either the present environment or one in the
future, contains C discrete structures that signal information. These structures
are elements of a system and the information they signal relates to an objective
property, D, of that system.
6
Across elements, signals may conflict. For example, an ox (the system) can
have fully developed horns (one element), but also low height (another element).
The first element signals greater weight (the objective property of the system),
while low height indicates the opposite.
Elements signal D perfectly when summed correctly,
∑C
j=1 Cj , but they also
signal D when the deviation from their corresponding mean element is summed,
(9) D − D¯ =
C∑
j=1
(Cj − C¯j),
where C¯j is the mean value of the j
′th element of the system, and D¯ is the mean
value of the objective property across the category of system in question. For
example, all the elements of an ox - its shoulders, its rump, its legs, and so on
- together signal what it weighs without any discrepancy. However, so does the
typical weight of oxen, together with all the differences between each element
and the mean across their corresponding elements in the category “ox”. This
assumed feature of the environment is crucial for how the cognitive system is
thought to form estimates of magnitude, given its limitations.
Finally, and defining for the AQ, the environment is simplified by the as-
sumption Cj − C¯j = ±v, where v is a constant for the amount of information
that each element signals about D
III.B. The Cognitive System
The cognitive system’s imperfections affect how it detects signals from the en-
vironment. The imperfections not only force the cognitive system to attend
elements sequentially but also introduce noise to its signal detection process.
That noise is the conjectured source of uncertainty in the estimates produced
by the cognitive system, and noisy signal detection is therefore the basic reason
why the KF should work on judgments of magnitude.
Adaptation Level Theory (Helson, 1947) and Norm-Based (Rhodes et al.,
2005) coding together explain the details. Due to its imperfections, the cogni-
tive system cannot process all the signals at once. However, by presuming the
objective property equals the norm of prior experience, the cognitive system
copes.
To presume the objective property equals the norm of prior experience works
because the objective property often is near that level when the environment
has regularities. Rather than treating every new situation as new, the cognitive
system instead focuses its limited resources on detecting how elements deviate
from their norms and thereby works out how it should adjust away from the
overall norm (i.e., the norm at the system level) given the evidence. Even
when detection is coarse, this strategy works well in regular environments when
detection errors are unsystematic, which the AQ assumes they are.
Subjects often form adaptation levels during psychophysical tasks (Helson,
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1947; Berniker et al., 2010), and scans of neurons during these tasks offer ev-
idence of norm-based coding in the brain (Leopold et al., 2006; Loffler et al.,
2005). Two pools of competing neurons that have the same level of activity at
the adaptation level are involved. One of these pools responds with increasing
average intensity to magnitudes greater than level, while the other decreases
its average intensity, thus forming an X-shaped pattern. Through their activ-
ity, these pools thus offer evidence about the deviation between the presented
stimuli, and the norm.
The AQ combines adaptive level theory, norm-based coding, and sequential
sampling to model magnitude estimation as an outcome of noisy evidence ac-
cumulation by neurons. Neurons introduce noise for two related reasons. First,
when they have the highest response, they win the right to define how elements
deviate from their norm, and second, neurons respond to stimulus with variation
and may sometimes win without basis.
More specifically, the cognitive system attends each Cj sequentially to es-
timate D, comparing each Cj to its corresponding mean, which the cognitive
system is assumed to have learned. For each Cj sampled, response variance
among the competing pools of neurons creates the possibility that neurons that
support the idea Cj < C¯j will respond with least intensity, although Cj ¡ Cj ,
and neurons supporting the idea Cj > C¯j will respond with least intensity, al-
though Cj > C¯j . Since the pools of neurons are assumed to win by having the
highest response, both cases will result in the wrong detection of Cj and will
cause an increase in the weight of evidence by +v when the proper incremental
change was −v and vice versa.
The final but most defining feature of the AQ is how simply it captures
the brain’s ability to detect signals. The AQ assumes the cognitive system
detects any element correctly with probability p, and any element wrongly with
probability 1−p. When p = 1, the accumulation of evidence leads to an estimate
equal toD because the evidence gathered by the pools of neurons will correspond
to the signals sent by the environment. For p < 1, however, the cognitive
system can produce many different estimates of D, thus causing an uncertain
link between the cognitive system’s estimate of D, and what magnitude D has.
The AQ becomes a Quincunx because of this final assumption about signal
detection. However, as its name suggests, the AQ is an augmented version of
Galton’s original device, which he built in 1873 to demonstrate the Central Limit
Theorem (Galton, 1894). In the AQ, “balls” move around displaced “pins” and
indicate “success” by heading left at some junctures, and right at others, whereas
Galton assigned “success” to one direction only, and this small difference is
decisive for applying the device to model human cognition.
As shown in detail elsewhere (Nash, 2017), the AQ predicts that estimates
by the cognitive system of how unusual something is can be described by a
random variable ed with the following mean, variance, skew, and kurtosis
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µ = (2p− 1)tv(10)
σ2 = 4C(1− p)pv2(11)
γ = − 2µ
Cσ
(12)
κ = 3 +
4v2
σ2
− 6
C
(13)
From here, the cognitive system estimates D without much effort by adding
D¯ to ed. Effectively, D¯ + ed offers researchers an exciting set of grounded
predictions about the uncertainty of estimates by the brain. As such, we can use
the AQ not only to implement the KF and remove some of these uncertainties
but also predict and understand the scope and limitations of the KF when
estimates come from humans.
IV. Predicting the Wisdom of a Kalman
Crowd using the AQ
Let us, therefore, return to the market and the problem faced by the butcher,
the farmer, and the official, who must optimally combine their judgments about
how much the ox weighs.
As before, we start by looking at the initial problem faced by the butcher
and the farmer, but now restate equations (4) and (5) using the AQ. Doing that
yields
(14) w∗1 =
4C (1− p2) p2v2 + (tv − (2p2 − 1) tv) ((2p1 − 1) tv − (2p2 − 1) tv)
4C (1− p1) p1v2 + 4C (1− p2) p2v2 + ((2p1 − 1) tv − (2p2 − 1) tv) 2
and
(15) w∗2 = 1−
4C (1− p2) p2v2 + (tv − (2p2 − 1) tv) ((2p1 − 1) tv − (2p2 − 1) tv)
4C (1− p1) p1v2 + 4C (1− p2) p2v2 + ((2p1 − 1) tv − (2p2 − 1) tv) 2
,
which provides insights beyond what equations (4) and (5) offer. Where those
equations tell us that we should place the most weight on the estimate that is
the most certain, holding the levels of bias constant, equations (14) and (15) go
deeper. They hold the more profound message that we should place the most
weight on estimates produced through more reliable signal detection because
that process is not only the most certain but also the least biased except when
the objective property is typical. Indeed, regarding bias, equations (14) and
(15) give us more than the general advice that we should place the least weight
on the most biased estimate, holding uncertainty constant. Instead, we now
learn that since greater bias occurs when the objective property is increasingly
extreme, and since estimates produced through more reliable signal detection
are less biased in all those situations, then we should place even more weight on
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such estimates when the objective property is more unusual. Simply put, adept
judges should be headed more when things are unusual.
Unfortunately, following that last piece of advice is practically impossible
because calibrating the weight placed on an estimate based on how unusual the
objective property is, implies knowing that magnitude already, which is what
we are trying to find out. Consequently, we must assume the objective property
is typical, which means setting t = 0. However, by making that assumption, we
are instantly assuming all estimates are unbiased, which means the predicted
nature of magnitude estimation has forced us to introduce to the KF what the
AQ predicts will be an imprecision. Nevertheless, we set t = 0 and thus obtain
an exact correspondence to the Kalman Gain equations (6) and (7) applicable
to unbiased electronic sensors. More precisely, equations (14) and (15) simplify
noticeably to
(16) w∗1 =
(1− p2) p2
(1− p1) p1 + (1− p2) p2
and
(17) w∗2 = 1−
(1− p2) p2
(1− p1) p1 + (1− p2) p2 .
At this point we notice the number of elements in the system, C, and the
evidence carried by each element, v, have been eliminated. Accordingly, what
the AQ tells us is that when the subject of estimation is typical, nothing par-
ticular about its character is essential for combining estimates optimally; the
relative reliability of signal detection, p1 versus p2, is all that matters.
IV.A. Verification by a third party:
How the butcher and the farmer, in our particular case, should know each other’s
values of p is something else entirely. In the case of proper scales, knowing the
uncertainty of estimates is easier because intensive testing increases the number
of observation beyond the point where further evidence has little effect. In
contrast, because we cannot run such tests on people, the limited number of
observed estimates affects our knowledge about how uncertain estimates are.
Consequently, our uncertainty about uncertainty reduces the prospect of placing
the correct weights. Nevertheless, we will defer this critical issue for a little
while yet. Instead, we will continue to assume that the butcher, the farmer, and
indeed the official who must verify that everything is in the best order, know
the inherent uncertainties of judgments.
Like before, we therefore prepare for the official’s update by first substituting
the Kalman Gain equations (equations (16) and (17)) into equation (3) while
remembering to set t = 0. Performing these substitutions gives
10
(18) MSEKF = 4Cv
2 (1− p1) p1 (1− p2) p2
(1− p1) p1 + (1− p2) p2 .
where C and v provide some useful insight. Simply put, some things are small
while other things are more prominent, and for that reason, the number of
elements and the information that each element provides will affect the size of
errors that people make.
IV.B. The AQ’s Property of Closure:
We have arrived at a crucial point in this paper. Earlier we noted the MSE of
the combined estimate is equal to the uncertainty of this estimate when it is
unbiased. Furthermore, we noted how the assumption of Gaussian distributed
estimates offers the possibility of modeling the combined estimate using a dis-
tribution that is also Gaussian, thus resetting the process mathematically after
every update. However, since the property of closure is rare, and since we must
use the AQ for theoretical reasons, producing an increasing amount of unruly
math after every step looks more likely.
Thankfully, however, that is wrong. The AQ offers the possibility of treating
every combined estimate as though a person with an equivalent level of signal
detection ability had produced it. We can do that because when we know the
value of p, then we also know the mean and variance of the estimate, which are
the essential ingredients we need to compute MSE. As such, we can set equation
(18) equal to variance equation (11) and solve for p to get
(19) pKF =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− 4 (1− p1) p1 (1− p2) p2
(1− p1) p1 + (1− p2) p2 .
We can interpret equations (16) to (19) from two perspectives, the first of which
is interesting from an organizational view. If we know the uncertainty of esti-
mates by individuals in a large group, then we can arrange this group into pairs,
and work out how much weight we should place on estimates by members of
each pair in order to minimize the MSE of the pair’s combined estimates. We
can then state the combined ability of each pair as if they were individuals, and
in doing so, can virtually halve the size of the group but with new aggregate
units that all generate less error than their constituents. At that point, we can
continue the process as though starting over mathematically, and form pairs
using the aggregate units, and so on until we have assembled all people into one
entity that generates estimates with the least possible MSE overall. Moreover,
no matter how we form our pairs, we would reach the same minimum. Alter-
natively, we may choose to interpret the function of equations (16) to (19) in
the standard way, as working recursively through estimates by members of the
group.
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Of course, the official who wants to obtain the best possible estimate of an
ox by combining his judgment with that made by a butcher and a farmer, or
the manager who wishes to obtain the best possible estimate from hundreds
of employees under her management, would want to know how the uncertainty
about uncertainty affects the KF. The time has come to look at that crucial
issue.
IV.C. The KFu vs. the KFc:
Let us suppose a manager wants to use the KF on estimates by her employees
about the earnings per share of Coca-Cola. How should the manager proceed
when there is no information about how the employees’ estimates, and Coca-
Cola’s earnings per share, relate?
It seems evident that what the manager should do is learn the relationship,
which essentially means observing how the estimates of different employees re-
late to earnings across many observations. As such, we can reframe the problem
to one of learning how the KF can be expected to perform as the observed num-
ber estimates increases, and when the manager uses the mean of the observed
squared errors to set w1 and w2 with the least margin to w
∗
1 and w
∗
2 .
For three reasons, we are going to keep the assumption that estimates are
unbiased. First, that links the problem to what we assumed above. Second,
it makes the mean of the observed squared errors equivalent to a sample of
variance, and third, it offers the opportunity to use Cochran’s Theorem, which
relates to the distribution of such samples when the random variable (i.e., the
estimate of magnitude in the present case) follows a Gaussian distribution. More
precisely, when samples of n observations are taken from the Gaussian distribu-
tion with variance σ2 then Cochran’s Theorem states that nS
2
σ2 ∼ χ2n−1, where
S2 is the sample variance. Consequently
(20) S2 ∼ Γ
(
n− 1
2
,
2σ2
n
)
.
At this point, the reader might ask how we can apply Cochran’s Theorem
in the current situation. After all, we took deliberate steps to model magnitude
estimates as random variables that capture aspects of both the environment
and the cognitive system, instead of merely assuming they follow the Gaussian
distribution. The answer is quite simply that ed tends towards the Gaussian
distribution under particular circumstances, which allows us to proceed as stated
while harvesting the deeper insight, which the AQ provides. More precisely, if
we assume the environment has an infinite number of elements and then assume
each of these elements tend to carry an infinitesimally small amount of evidence,
then the moment generating function of ed becomes
(21) Mx = e
−2(p−1)px2 ,
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which equals the moment generating function of the Gaussian distribution
with zero mean, and with variance given by (11). In other words, ed is Gaussian
under the specified assumptions. We can, therefore, make these assumptions
about C and t and proceed to compare the MSE produced by the KF when
weights on pairs of estimates are placed certainly versus uncertainly. Denoting
the MSE of the uncertain KF by KFu, and the MSE of the certain KF by KFc,
the difference in MSE generated by these two filters is given by
(22) KFu −KFc =
σ21
 S22
S21 + S
2
2
 2 + σ22
1 − S22
S1 + S
2
2
 2 −
σ21
 σ22
σ21 + σ
2
2
 2 + σ22
1 − σ22
σ21 + σ
2
2
 2
which is a random variable due to (20). Setting n = 2, because this corresponds
to the level in our upcoming empirical study, we find the expectation of equation
(22) to be
(23) E[KFu −KFc] =
σ21
−5 (σ22) 5/2 (σ21) 3/2 + 8σ21σ62 +
√√√√σ182
σ21
+
√
σ101 σ
6
2 − 5
√
σ21σ
14
2

2σ22
(
σ21 − σ22
)
2
(
σ21 + σ
2
2
) .
Finally, making use of the fact that variance equation (11) simplifies to
4(1 − p)p when C = ∞ and v → 0, we substitute 4(1 − p1)p1 for σ21 and
4(1− p2)p2 for σ22 in (23) to generate the top panel of Figure 1.
We learn two things from Figure 1, and both say something about how well
we can expect the KF to work in practice. First, the certain KF beats the
uncertain KF mainly when unreliable signal detection defines the sources of
estimates. Second, the certain KF beats the uncertain KF by less when good
signal detection defines one of the sources, even when the reliability of the other
is constant. In both cases, signal detection determines the inherent uncertainty
of estimates, which in turn determines the expected difference between the in-
herent and inferred uncertainty. More precisely, the expected difference can be
shown to be 4(1−p)pn . Accordingly, we state the following predictions:
Prediction 1: The KF will function better (worse) when people are
adept (novice).
Prediction 2: The KF will function better (worse) when people have
easier (harder) estimation problems.
Prediction 3: The KF will function better (worse) when people have
shorter (longer) forecast horizons.
These predictions are the same from the AQ’s perspective. They assert
the KF functions better (worse) when p is larger (smaller) since the difference
between the inherent and inferred uncertainty 4(1−p)pn is smaller (larger) in those
situations, which results in combinations of estimates that are closer to (farther
from) optimal.
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Figure I: The Certain Kalman Filter vs. Other Rules
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Figure II: The Equal-Weight Model vs. the Uncertain Kalman Filter
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IV.D. The EWM vs. the KFu:
The certain KF beats the EWR for any pair of p1 and p2 (Figure 1, middle),
but more interesting is the performance of the uncertain KF versus the EWR,
(24) EW −KFu =
(( 1
2
)2
σ
2
1 +
( 1
2
)2
σ
2
2
)
−
(
σ
2
1
(
S2
S1 + S2
)
2
+ σ
2
2
(
1 −
S2
S1 + S2
)
2
)
.
Like equation (21), EW −KFu is a random variable due to equation (20), but
we can examine its expected value. Setting n = 2, that value is
(25) E[EW−KFu] =
12
(
σ22
)
5/2
(
σ21
)
3/2 − 2
(
σ22
)
3/2
(
σ21
)
5/2 + σ82 − 5σ21σ62 − 5σ41σ42 + σ61σ22 − 2
√
σ21σ
14
2
4σ22
(
σ21 − σ22
)
2
.
Finally, by substituting 4(1−p1)p1 for σ21 and 4(1−p2)p2 for σ22 into equation
(25), we can generate Figure 2.
From the right side of Figure 2, we notice that at the studied level of un-
certainty, the EWR beats the uncertain KF for most p1 and p2 combinations.
However, we also notice the uncertain KF beats the EWR when highly reliable
signal detection processes define one of the estimates to be combined. Again, this
makes good sense because smaller inherent uncertainty defines such estimates.
With smaller inherent uncertainty, an observer will experience less uncertainty
about uncertainty, than when this basic uncertainty is more substantial. The
weight placed on the certain estimate will thereby tend to be correct. However,
so will the weight placed on the other, even though this estimate is more un-
certain, because the weights sum to one. Accordingly, the KF gets this type of
situation right, whereas the EWM gets it wrong per definition.
The left side of Figure 3 offers further insight. Not surprisingly, the EWR
outperforms by most when p1 = p2 because here the rule is optimal, while
the uncertain KF only hits optima on average. Perhaps less obvious, however,
is the observation that although the EWR beats the uncertain KF for most
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p1 and p2 combinations, the effect is only marginal when that happens. In
contrast, in those regions where the uncertain KF beats the EWR, it does so
with considerable margin. Accordingly, we state the following predictions:
Prediction 4: The KF will lose by a small margin to the EWR when
people have similar levels of adeptness.
Prediction 5: The KF will lose by a small margin to the EWR when
people are diverse but novice on average.
Prediction 6: The KF will beat the EWR by a large margin when people
are diverse but adept on average.
Prediction 7: The KF will beat the EWR by a large margin when some
people are adept, and others are novice.
Predictions 5 and 6 can be detailed further in terms of problem difficulty,
but we leave that implied by predictions 1 - 3.
IV.E. The SR vs. the KFu:
When we know the uncertainty of estimates, then combining the estimates avail-
able using the KF is better than waiving this opportunity (Figure 1, bottom).
However, beyond some difference between the inherent and inferred uncertainty,
the weight we give to pairs of estimates may be so far from optimal that some es-
timates are better left as they are. These include individual estimates by adept
people, but they also include estimates by many people that we have already
combined using some rule, including the CWM or the KF itself. In both cases,
we are dealing with the inclusion of some subset of estimates, and the rejection
of others. We therefore call this rule the Subset Rule (SR).
To see how the uncertain KF performs against the SR, we will use p1 to
capture the MSE of the subset estimate. We will then compare that MSE to
the one we could obtain if we instead fused the subset estimate with another
estimate (defined by p2) using the uncertain KF. As before, however, our first
step is to express the difference in MSE most generally. That difference is the
random variable
(26) SR−KFu = σ21 −
(
σ21
(
S22
S21 + S
2
2
)
2 + σ22
(
1− S
2
2
S21 + S
2
2
)
2
)
,
which has an expected value of
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Figure III: The Subset Rule vs. the Uncertain Kalman Filter
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when n = 2. Finally, we substitute 4(1 − p1)p1 for σ21 and 4(1 − p2)p2 for σ22
into equation (27) to generate Figure 3.
As anticipated from the bottom of Figure 1, the right side of Figure 3 reveals
that waiving the opportunity to combine the available estimates requires that a
high level of p1 defines the subset. However, even when that condition is met,
waiving the opportunity to combine the available estimates requires a second
condition. It also requires that the other estimate is defined by a small to a
moderate level of p2. If not, then the uncertain KF will beat the SR. Moreover,
as the left side of Figure 3 shows, when p2 is high and becomes exactly so high
that the uncertain KF just becomes superior, then this marginal effect is quite
substantial, at least compared with the similar situation where p2 is small or
moderate. Accordingly, we state the following predictions:
Prediction 8: The KF will beat the SR unless the subset’s estimate is
defined by high reliability, and the excluded estimate is not.
Prediction 9: When the KF beats the SR, it will do so with greater
effect when the excluded estimate is defined by high reliability.
V. Study: Professional Forecasters of
Economic Variables
We used data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) to see how
well the KF works on estimates of magnitude made by humans. The American
Statistical Association and the National Bureau of Economic Research started
the survey in 1968, but the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (FRBP) took
over in 1990. SPF is the oldest quarterly survey of macroeconomic forecasts in
the United States.
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The SPF offers an excellent opportunity to examine how well the KF works
in a setting not too different from the ones that managers face. The survey
concerns economic variables that affect the environment of firms, and its partic-
ipants have strong knowledge of finance, economics, and banking. As such, the
forecasters in the survey are like many managers. Moreover, the data from the
survey is plentiful, but also sparse due to turnover among its participants. Since
turnover among managers also characterizes firms, this feature adds unique re-
alism — it changes the knowledge base of the survey through time and creates
practical obstacles to harnessing the wisdom of crowds that firms also have. Fur-
thermore, the survey involves forecasting over different horizons and thereby has
various degrees of difficulty. Finally, because the survey is about the US econ-
omy, it mirrors the dynamic forecasting problems that managers solve through
the financial year.
Besides being very suitable to the management domain, the SPF also has
features that make it very relevant for studying different aggregation rules, in-
cluding the KF. Most notably, participants are anonymous, which reduces the
incentive to conform and makes their estimates more independent. Moreover,
given their adeptness, we can expect them to be less biased than novices.
Last, but not least, since forecasts are known (Stark, 2010) to involve the
use of intuitive judgment, using the AQ to inform our study makes good sense.
V.A. Data Collection
We analyzed quarterly forecasts of 12 variables relating to the US economy
across five horizons, these horizons being 1 to 5 quarters (steps) ahead. The
selected economic variables were chosen because the FRBP offers vintage data
for them. Vintage data is crucial because it shows the historical data available to
forecasters as they forecast, as well as the actual value of the economic variable
as the FRBP first reports them, absent any official changes that forecasters could
not foresee. To create consistency across variables, we converted all forecasts and
realized values to yearly percentage changes, except for civilian unemployment,
which the FRBP already states in percentage terms. Since the start in 1968,
the average number of forecasters in each survey has ranged from 30 to 36,
whose typical tenure has varied between 11 to 18 surveys. The turnover rate
of forecasters has varied 15 to 23 percent. In total, the data consists of 326238
forecasts across 9715 surveys. Table 1 and Table 2 offer further details of the
surveys and some descriptive statistics.
V.B. Method
We treated the data like a company would as it receives forecasts from different
employees about business variables across time. Accordingly, our “company”
could only update its measures of individual performance using the data avail-
able before the latest survey. We assumed the company updated two such
measures for each economic variable and forecast horizon and then used these
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TABLE I: The Twelve Economic Variables and their
Abbreviations
Variable Abbreviation
Nonfarm Payroll Employment EMP
Housing Starts HOUSING
Nominal Gross National Product NOUTPUT
Price Index for Gross National Product PGDP
Industrial Production Index INDPROD
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures RCONSUM
Real Federal Government Consumption Expenditures RFEDGOV
Real Gross National Product RGDP
Real Nonresidential Fixed Investment RNRESIN
Real Residential Fixed Investment RRESINV
Real State and Local Government Consumption RSLGOV
Civilian Unemployment Rate UNEMP
TABLE II: Descriptive Statistics for the Survey of Professional
Forecasters
Abbreviation No. surveys Median No. judges Median tenure Turnover rate
EMP 275 36 18 0.15
HOUSING 965 34 15 0.23
NOUTPUT 975 35 16 0.22
PGDP 975 35 15 0.22
INDPROD 975 33 15 0.23
RCONSUM 720 33 11 0.19
RFEDGOV 720 31 12 0.19
RGDP 975 36 15 0.22
RNRESIN 720 31 11 0.19
RRESINV 720 32 11 0.19
RSLGOV 720 30 12 0.19
UNEMP 975 36 16 0.22
Total surveys: 9715
Total forecasts: 326238
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to weigh the estimates that “employees” (i.e., the professional forecasters) pro-
vided. All estimates by forecasters with fewer than two observations were dis-
counted completely by all aggregation rules. That rule is identical to the one
used by Budescu and Chen (2015) in their study of survey data from the Euro-
pean Central Bank.
One of the performance measures used was p from the AQ model, which
was estimated using the latest mean of the forecaster’s squared errors. More
precisely, because we had to assume that estimates were unbiased for theoretical
reasons1, the MSE and variance equation (11) become equal, such that
(28) MSE = 4C(1− p)pv2 ⇒ p = 1
2
+
√
Cv2 (Cv2 −MSE)
2Cv2
.
Accordingly, as new squared errors by the particular forecaster became avail-
able, the estimate of the forecaster’s p could be updated and used to determine
what weight the estimate from the forecaster should receive in the KF on the
next survey where the forecaster was active (see equations (16) to (19) for de-
tailed instructions). However, as equation (28) reveals, the constants C and v
had to be set first. What these are is arbitrary for the KF since they apply
to all forecasters across all periods (see equation (19) for details). However, we
set C = 1 in all surveys and across all horizons to provide the opportunity of
direct comparison. Moreover, we used the same rule across all surveys to set
v. Specifically, v was set by first assuming the norm of each economic vari-
able equaled their arithmetic average in the vintage data. Then, we identified
the most extreme observation for each time-series. Finally, we computed the
absolute difference of this extreme value from the norm and set v to that value2.
The second performance measure used was contribution (CW), which forms
the basis of the CWM. The contribution of each forecaster just before the current
survey is the average difference between the MSE of the EWR with and without
the forecaster included, across all surveys where the forecaster has been active.
Formally, that is expressed as
(29) CWj =
1
Nj
Nj∑
i=1
(
EWRi − EWR−ji
)
1. As stated earlier, the AQ predicts that estimates are biased when the objective property
is unusual. However, we cannot grant forecasters any knowledge about the objective property
and must, therefore, assume the objective property equals the norm. In turn, that assumption
leads to the assumption of unbiased estimates, since the AQ makes that prediction when the
objective property has that magnitude
2. Although not crucial for the KF, the way v and C are decided is consistent with the
workings of the Quincunx. In essence, what we did was set the value of C and v such that
balls falling through the device could reach every one of its compartments. Had we instead
assumed that v was smaller, then the most extreme observations could, in strict theoretical
accordance with the AQ, not be inferred because the C = 1 element would not carry enough
information
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Figure IV: Median Values of Estimated p across Forecast Horizons
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where j = 1, ..., J denotes the particular forecaster, and Nj denotes the
surveys where the forecaster was active. CW formed the basis of the CWM in
the current survey in three steps. First, the subset of active forecasters with
positive CW were identified. Second, the corresponding positive CWj ’s were
normalized, and finally, these normalized CWj ’s were used to assign a weight
to the predictions of the associated forecaster. As such, the CWM is a weighted
average computed at once, whereas the KF is computed recursively.
V.C. Comparison of the Aggregation Rules
Table 3 compares the performance of four aggregation rules. These rules are
the EWM, the KF, the SR represented by the CWM, and the KF+. The KF+
is like the CWM but with an important difference. It works on the same subset
of forecasts, but where the CWM weighs forecasts using the normalized positive
contribution measures, the KF+ assigns weights using the KF based on the
estimated p’s. Consequently, we can attribute any difference in performance
between the CWM and the KF+ to how optimally they assign weights.
Both the KF and the CWM easily beat the EWM on average and did so
with greater clarity when the forecast horizons were longer. This result can be
explained by the content of Figure 4, and supports prediction 6. Figure 4 shows
that for longer forecast horizons, the diversity in p increases, yet forecasters
remain highly adept on average. According to Prediction 6, that situation is
most detrimental for the EWM compared with the KF.
Meanwhile, the KF beat the CWM on average for 1, 2, and 3 steps ahead,
but was beaten on average by the CWM when the horizons were 4 and 5 steps
ahead. This finding can again be explained by the content of Figure 4, and
supports Prediction 8. Figure 4 shows that longer forecast horizons affect the
distribution of p not only by reducing the typical value of p but by reducing the
typical minimum by significantly more than it reduces the typical maximum.
Consequently, the distribution of p becomes increasingly defined by negative
skewness caused by a tail that stretches farther into the region of lower p. In
contrast, for shorter horizons, the general level of p is not only higher, but the
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TABLE III: RMSEs, and DM p-values versus CWM, for Different
Variables and Forecast Horizons
RMSE Diebold-Mariano p-values
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
EMP EWM 0.26 0.46 0.75 1.06 1.42 0.60 0.12 0.27 0.86 0.86
KF 0.25 0.46 0.73 1.03 1.38 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.51 0.25
CWM 0.26 0.48 0.76 1.02 1.39
KF+ 0.24 0.47 0.72 0.99 1.36 0.02 + 0.27 0.03 + 0.05 0.08
HOUSING EWM 7.27 11.32 14.86 18.71 22.73 0.59 0.90 0.97 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
KF 7.66 11.14 14.47 18.13 22.01 0.83 0.72 0.81 0.95 - 0.97 -
CWM 7.22 10.98 14.19 17.45 20.81
KF+ 7.66 10.91 14.18 17.58 20.84 0.82 0.39 0.48 0.66 0.53
NOUTPUT EWM 0.79 1.29 1.73 2.14 2.54 0.07 0.05 + 0.91 0.94 0.98-
KF 0.78 1.29 1.70 2.08 2.47 0.01+ 0.03 + 0.74 0.71 0.83
CWM 0.81 1.34 1.68 2.05 2.42
KF+ 0.78 1.28 1.69 2.03 2.42 0.00 + 0.01 + 0.61 0.33 0.47
PGDP EWM 0.40 0.67 0.94 1.27 1.62 0.00 + 0.05 + 0.48 0.75 0.92
KF 0.40 0.67 0.93 1.24 1.61 0.01 + 0.03 + 0.40 0.65 0.90
CWM 0.43 0.69 0.94 1.22 1.47
KF+ 0.41 0.67 0.91 1.18 1.52 0.03 + 0.02 + 0.23 0.30 0.70
PROD EWM 1.28 2.25 3.21 4.08 4.86 0.93 0.97 - 0.93 0.94 0.47
KF 1.27 2.23 3.19 4.04 4.83 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.35
CWM 1.24 2.17 3.13 3.96 4.86
KF+ 1.25 2.19 3.13 3.97 4.75 0.78 0.79 0.54 0.48 0.05 +
RCONSUM EWM 0.69 0.96 1.20 1.50 1.84 0.12 0.62 0.12 0.11 0.16
KF 0.69 0.96 1.18 1.49 1.94 0.13 0.64 0.08 0.09 0.47
CWM 0.80 0.95 1.30 1.62 1.95
KF+ 0.68 0.97 1.17 1.45 1.88 0.13 0.80 0.04 + 0.03 + 0.32
RFEDGOV EWM 2.15 2.52 2.74 3.09 3.56 0.12 0.18 0.29 0.27 0.59
KF 2.13 2.45 2.68 3.03 3.52 0.10 0.04 + 0.13 0.16 0.49
CWM 2.28 2.60 2.80 3.19 3.52
KF+ 2.13 2.39 2.64 3.00 3.43 0.06 0.01 + 0.06 0.05 0.28
RGDP EWM 0.72 1.24 1.67 2.09 2.47 0.07 0.01 + 0.47 0.64 0.19
KF 0.71 1.21 1.64 2.07 2.47 0.04 + 0.00 + 0.22 0.53 0.21
CWM 0.75 1.37 1.68 2.07 2.56
KF+ 0.71 1.20 1.60 2.05 2.44 0.01 + 0.01 + 0.03 + 0.35 0.13
RNRESIN EWM 2.49 3.80 5.21 6.74 8.30 0.09 0.89 0.98 - 0.98 - 0.97 -
KF 2.50 3.78 5.16 6.73 8.12 0.15 0.88 0.97 - 0.91 0.74
CWM 2.54 3.71 4.98 6.51 8.03
KF+ 2.51 3.75 5.11 6.64 7.93 0.21 0.71 0.94 0.74 0.19
RRESINV EWM 2.82 4.52 6.48 8.56 10.63 0.19 0.57 0.97 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
KF 2.91 4.38 6.26 8.41 10.58 0.39 0.27 0.69 1.00 - 1.00 -
CWM 2.94 4.49 6.19 8.06 9.81
KF+ 2.97 4.25 6.10 8.21 10.19 0.67 0.08 0.27 0.87 0.98 -
RSLGOV EWM 0.93 1.25 1.43 1.68 2.03 0.08 0.68 0.57 0.66 0.97 -
KF 0.91 1.24 1.41 1.63 1.98 0.05 0.60 0.38 0.26 0.87
CWM 1.03 1.23 1.43 1.66 1.93
KF+ 0.93 1.22 1.40 1.61 1.91 0.10 0.30 0.21 0.07 0.26
UNEMP EWM 0.16 0.37 0.56 0.76 0.91 1.00 - 0.90 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 -
KF 0.15 0.36 0.55 0.74 0.89 0.94 0.69 1.00 - 1.00 - 0.98 -
CWM 0.14 0.36 0.53 0.70 0.87
KF+ 0.14 0.36 0.54 0.72 0.87 0.23 0.30 0.88 0.94 0.57
+ Significant at the five percent level against the CWM.
− Significant at the five percent level for the CWM.
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tail is also much shorter. Since Prediction 8 states the KF will beat the SR with
a more significant margin when higher reliability defines the excluded estimates,
the finding provides confirming evidence.
The KF+, however, performed best of all, outperforming the KF and the
CWM on average for every forecast horizon. Furthermore, just like its more
inclusive relative, the KF+ outperformed with greater clarity on shorter forecast
horizons. This again supports Prediction 8, since the effect of discounting all
forecasters with negative CW is to shorten the tail of the p distribution.
V.D. Comparing Smaller, Wiser Crowds.
Next, we examined the performance of the KF versus the CWM, and the KF
against the EWM, as we discounted an increasing number of the lowest per-
forming forecasters. As shown by Figure 5 and 6, this investigation gave greater
nuance to the conclusion based on the entire data. In particular, as shown by
Figure 5, although the EWM was inferior before, it now outperformed the KF
on average when it considered only the ten-highest performing active forecast-
ers based on p. This finding is consistent with Prediction 4, which states that
the EWR will tend to beat the KF when the estimates to be combined have
similar reliability. By definition, excluding the worst performers makes the in-
cluded forecasters more alike. For this same reason, we can also explain why
the EWM deteriorates so quickly compared with the KF when both include an
increasing number of inferior forecasters. Quite simply, increasing the number
of participants considered has the opposite effect on diversity.
Figure 6 compares both the KF and the KF+ with the CWM, uncover-
ing three new patterns. First, the KF beat the CWM model more clearly as
we discounted all but the top two active forecasters, and second, the point of
greatest relative performance by the KF involved more individuals for shorter
forecast horizons and fewer individuals for longer horizons. Finally, whenever
the KF beat the CWM by the highest margin, it matched the performance of the
KF+, except for the most extended forecast horizon where the KF+ performed
noticeably better.
The first pattern supports Prediction 8 and Prediction 9 in unison. Accord-
ing to Prediction 8, the KF will beat the SR when estimates by the subset and
by the other entity are both defined by high reliability. Moreover, Prediction
9 states the effect will be more significant when higher reliability defines both
estimates. Since the increased focus on the best performers makes the forecast-
ers more homogeneous and raises their average level of adeptness, we notice the
support for these predictions quite easily.
We can explain the second pattern by considering that more forecasters
become more reliable (i.e., more forecasters have high values of p) when the
forecasting horizon shortens (Figure 4). Consequently, the KF improves more
quickly as it discounts the worst forecasters in surveys relating to shorter fore-
casts.
Finally, we cannot fully explain the last observation. The idea that KF+ and
KF consider precisely the same forecasters at that point where KF performs best
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Figure V: The KF versus the EWM across Forecast Horizons and Subsets of
Forecasters
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is not entirely adequate. For that idea to be comprehensive, the gap observed in
the case of the most extended forecast horizon should not be there. Accordingly,
we cannot reject the idea that CW provides a way to find people with unique
insight into long-scale developments, whose estimates should not be fused with
those by people lacking such knowledge. What is clear, however, is that having
perhaps identified such people, the CWM weighs their estimates less optimally
than the KF.
VI. Discussion
Unpredictable fluctuations and disturbances that are not part of the signal are
a central feature of the nervous system (Faisal et al., 2008). That observation
has led to the idea that our representations of the environment are probabilistic,
which means that when we make a judgment, we are sampling from a probability
distribution (Ma et al., 2006). In turn, this idea led to the theory (Vul and
Pashler, 2008) that when we observe the wisdom of the crowd, what we are
witness to is not a phenomenon working on a judgment distribution formed by
people who are certain, and who would form the same distribution if asked
to judge again. Instead, the wisdom of the crowd arises from each person
having drawn an uncertain estimate from their probabilistic representation of
the circumstances.
But if the fundamental nature of our cognitive system causes the wisdom
of crowds, then it creates some basic questions for researchers who work in the
particular domain of management relating to better decision-making. If a man-
agerial judgment is a random variable, perhaps we can successfully use methods
from engineering that aim to estimate physical properties of the environment
by filtering signals from the noise in multiple sensors. From the perspective of
traditional management, the idea perhaps seems a little far fetched, but from
other perspectives (Luce, 1972), which see the brain as a measuring device, the
idea is quite reasonable. In any case, we aimed to find out in this paper, and
our results offer positive indications.
What we did was move the Kalman Filter (Kalman, 1960) (KF) from the
domain of electrical engineering to management with the help of the AQ model
of probabilistic judgment (Nash, 2017), which recently appeared in the field
of mathematical psychology. Using that model, we matched the KF against
the classic Equal-Weight Model (EWM) and the Contribution Weighted Model
(Budescu and Chen, 2015) (CWM), which has proven, on numerous occasions
(Budescu and Chen, 2015; Chen et al., 2016), to be an excellent rule for com-
bining estimates from many sources.
Our predictions based on the AQ suggest, and our empirical findings show,
that using the KF is better than using the EWM or the CWM in those situations
where the uncertainty of estimates is generally small, while there remains some
diversity in the ability of people to judge. However, when the adeptness of
judges is smaller, which it is, for example, when forecasting horizons are longer,
then the CWM outperforms. The reason is that while the CWM works on a
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Figure VI: The KF versus the CWM across Forecast Horizons and Subsets of
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subset of more certain estimates, the KF includes all the available forecasts.
That led to the idea that it should be possible to give the KF greater effect
by using it on the specific subset of estimates identified by the CWM, and that
proved correct. The KF+, as we called this version of KF, beat the CWM
on average across all forecast horizons. Consequently, since the KF and the
CWM were directly comparable in this situation, we may conclude, as Budescu
and Chen Budescu and Chen (2015) recently did, that the CWM works not
so much because it applies differential weights optimally, but because it can
identify forecasters, whose estimates should not be given any weight at all. In
comparison, what we demonstrated in this paper is that when the CWM has
identified the elite, then the KF can perform the task of differential weighting
exceedingly well.
In summary, we have shown not only that using the Kalman Filter on judg-
ments has merit in theory, but also that in practice, this invention, which helped
Armstrong safely to the moon and back (McGee and Schmidt, 1985), can help
managers navigate through difficult problems by giving them stronger signals
before they decide.
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